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STUDENT NOTES/COMMENTS
US v. Aguilar and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Sending an S.O.S. to Congress
Jared Chaykin1
INTRODUCTION
When Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”) in 1977, United States citizens and people across the
world were disgusted with the U.S. political system and the cor-
rupt business practices of American companies in other countries.2
However, since Congress enacted the popularly-demanded regula-
tion to curb American businesses’ abusive behavior, arguments
over the FCPA have recently devolved into a minefield. This note
will address one area of contention—the definition of an “instru-
mentality” and “foreign official” in light of U.S. v. Aguilar3 and
U.S. v. Carson.4 This note begins by outlining the FCPA, including
the events that brought about its genesis, as well as the limited
case law interpreting the FCPA. The discussion will then turn to
the meaning of the terms “foreign official” and “instrumentality”
as used in the FCPA, and the controversy surrounding these defi-
nitions. This note will also provide an overview and analysis of
U.S. v Aguilar and U.S. v. Carson, concluding that the Aguilar
and Carson decisions provide some guidance to businesses regard-
ing what constitutes unlawful business practices, although Con-
gress must provide U.S. businesses with better guidance to enable
such companies to abide by FCPA’s provisions.
1. B.A., University of Miami, 2007;  J.D., University of Miami School of Law,
2013. When I met you in tennis camp fifteen years ago, Livia, I knew you were on a
path to unbridled success, but little did I know, you would take me with you, and give
me the greatest gifts of all: your parents and our son, Garyd.
2. See generally Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act-1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 92-93 (2010) (noting that the
FCPA was a product of the Watergate era).
3. 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
4. No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *12 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011).
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I. THE FCPA
A. Events Preceding the Enactment of the FCPA
Most associate the Watergate scandal with the attempted
burglary of the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters in
1972.5 Behind the burglary drama, the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (“SEC”) enforcement chief, Stanley Sporkin, investi-
gated the Nixon campaign’s financial documents and discovered
that many public companies illegally contributed to U.S. political
campaigns.6 This finding led Sporkin and the SEC to investigate
the companies that contributed to the Nixon campaign to deter-
mine how the companies accounted for these illegal cash
exchanges.7 An analysis of the contributions revealed secret
accounts maintained by companies that were used to bribe and
pay illegal political contributions.8
After Sporkin’s investigation, the SEC conducted additional
formal investigations, which revealed that companies were mak-
ing illegal contributions via cash slush funds maintained in for-
eign countries.9 Further analysis revealed that U.S. companies
were paying foreign officials in Japan, Italy, and Mexico.10 In 1977
the SEC issued a report based on volunteered information from
public companies, which were in return offered leniency from the
SEC regarding questionable payments made to foreign govern-
ments.11 From the self-reported information the companies pro-
vided, the SEC reported that American businesses, like Exxon-
Mobil and Boeing, made hundreds of millions of dollars in “ques-
tionable” but legal payments to foreign government officials.12
B. Enactment of the FCPA
In response to U.S. companies’ actions, Congress passed the
Foreign Corruption Practices Act of 1977.13 The FCPA, which
amended the Securities and Exchange Act of 1932, changed how
5. Bixby, supra note 2, at 92.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 92-93.
8. Id. at 93.
9. Cortney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of Rapid
Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 442-43 (2010).
10. International Anti-Bribery Act of 1998, in FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
REPORTER, Appx. D, at 3 (2d ed. 2012).
11. H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).
12. Thomas, supra note 9, at 443.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1998).
\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\44-1\IAL105.txt unknown Seq: 3  1-NOV-13 11:28
2012] SENDING AN S.O.S. TO CONGRESS 65
companies may conduct business in foreign countries in two ways:
pursuant to the FCPA, companies (1) must maintain transparent
accounting methods, and (2) cannot make corrupt bribery pay-
ments to foreign officials.14
However, the anti-bribery sections of the FCPA, located in 15
U.S.C. §§ 78 dd-1–dd-3,15 did not completely abolish payments
made to foreign officials.16 A company, or any agent acting on
behalf of a U.S. company, violates the FCPA when “act[ing] in fur-
therance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of
the payment of something of value [to] any foreign official.”17 The
term “foreign official” includes an official of a public international
organization, a political candidate, or a political party. To violate
the FCPA, an agent must also act with mens rea, with the intent
to “corruptly induce or influence the official to act or refrain from
acting, or to gain any improper advantage,18 [in order] to assist the
company in obtaining, retaining, or directing business to any
person.”19
The FCPA permits U.S. businesses to make three types of
payments to foreign officials: “(1) facilitating payments, (2) promo-
tional expenses, and (3) payments permitted under the written
laws of the host country.”20 The first type of payment, facilitating
payments, may only be made to foreign officials for the purpose of
“secur[ing] the performance of a routine government action . . .”21
Moreover, payments made to an official can only be for the pur-
poses of “expediting or facilitating” routine government action.22
Routine government actions include issuing licenses that are nec-
14. Brown, supra note 11, at 4.
15. Rebecca Koch, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s Time to Cut Back
the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 383 (2005)
§ 78 dd-1 pertains to “issuers;” § 78 dd-2 relates to “domestic concerns;” and § 78 dd-3
governs parties that are neither issuers or domestic concerns.
16. Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative Reform in the
United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 365, 381 (2011) (noting that the exceptional payments is a “concession
to the culture of bribery”).
17. Gary Eisenberg, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 602-
03 (2000).
18. Id. at 604 (citations omitted). Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing before the
Subcom. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 74 (2011) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Shana-Tara
Regon, Dir., White Collar Crime Policy, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers).
19. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 603 (citations omitted).
20. RICHARD L. CASSIN, BRIBERY ABROAD: LESSONS FROM THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 31 (1998).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (b) (1998).
22. Frank W. Blue, A Challenge to Multinational Corporate Counsel: Foreign
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essary for a business to operate in a foreign country and providing
police protection and mail pick-up/delivery, which is “associated
with contract performance . . . related to transit of goods across
country.” Moreover, “protecting perishable items . . . from deterio-
ration,” providing power, phone, or water, are also routine govern-
ment actions.23 A “routine government action” is an action by a
government official that does not entail the official making a deci-
sion about whether “to award new business to or continue busi-
ness with a particular party.”24
The second type of permissible payment, a “promotional pay-
ment,” is the payment of “reasonable and bona fide expendi-
ture[s].”25 Bona fide expenditures, such as travel and lodging
expenses, are costs “directly related to the promotion, demonstra-
tion, or explanation of products or services; or the execution or
performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency
thereof.”26 “Many of the FCPA’s detractors bemoan the usefulness
of these exceptions27 because the Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
narrowly interprets this provision.28 For example, a business
expenditure is deemed unlawful if a foreign official is treated
extravagantly or a business pays the costs associated with the
travel of a foreign official’s family or friends.29
Both the SEC and the DOJ are tasked with enforcing the
FCPA. The SEC levies civil fines against those who violate the
FCPA’s accounting provisions,30 while the DOJ prosecutes those
who violate its anti-bribery provisions.31 The Attorney General
Corrupt Practices Act Compliance and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 33 TEX. J.
BUS. L. 2, 10 (1996).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (f)(3)(A)(i)-(v) (1998).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (f)(3)(B) (1998).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (c)(2) (1998).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (c)(2)(A)-(B) (1998).
27. See generally Hearings, supra note 18, at 76 (statement of F. James
Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security).
28. Bonneau, supra note 16, at 381.
29. Todd Swanson, Greasing the Wheels: British Deficiencies in Relation to
American Clarity in International Anti-Corruption Law, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
397, 413 (2007) (citing DONALD R. CURVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
MARKETPLACE 22 (2d ed. 1999)).
30. James W. Chang, Legal Issues Relating to Transacting Business Abroad: What
Every Lawyer Should Know About the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 HOUS. L. 16,
17 (1997); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The
Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 508-09
(2011).
31. CASSIN, supra note 20, at 13.
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responds to requests by U.S. companies regarding whether speci-
fied conduct violates the FCPA.32 The FCPA cautions that the
DOJ’s responses correspond to the “specific conduct” conveyed in a
company’s opinion request.33 FCPA violations can result in both
individual and company-wide criminal sanctions. For example, a
violation of the accounting provisions could result in a twenty-
year prison sentence, while anti-bribery provision violations could
result in a five-year prison sentence.34 The SEC can fine compa-
nies and impose non-monetary penalties, such as loss of export
privileges and restrictions on the ability to obtain government
contracts. As a result, both companies and individuals suffer from
incalculable reputational damages.35
C. Issues Surrounding the FCPA
Perhaps one of the greatest issues surrounding the FCPA has
been the resurgence in enforcement. Over the FCPA’s first
twenty-five years, the SEC and the DOJ pursued only sixty cases
against corporations.36 While the reason for such limited action is
unclear, some argue that the FCPA was “underutilized,” while
others argue that the FCPA, as initially passed, was ambiguously
worded such that it frightened businesses away from venturing
into foreign markets.37 Some have even noted that the 1988
amendments to the FCPA were a reaction to corporate complaints
that the FCPA was “too vague and wide in scope.”38
Recently, the number of individuals fined and prosecuted for
FCPA violations has dramatically increased. Initially, the busi-
ness world deemed the FCPA to be a statute that only threatened




36. Bixby, supra note 2, at 103.
37. Id.
38. Id. For example, before 1988 the FCPA excluded from the definition of foreign
official those individuals who performed “ministerial or clerical” work. Adam
Fremantle & Sherman Katz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988,
23 INT’L L. 755, 761 (1989). The purpose of the initial exclusion was to allow certain
“grease payments” that would allow for the expedited performance of “ministerial or
clerical” functions that would have been performed in any event. Id. at 762. The 1988
amendment allows for the payment to be directed at “any foreign official,” as long as
the action is “ordinarily and commonly performed” by that foreign official. Id. Thus,
this was an attempt to clarify a “facilitating payment” by focusing on the underlying
purpose of the payment rather than focusing on the person who actually receives the
payment.
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corporations.39 Over the last decade, however, the DOJ has made
it clear that individuals will be held accountable for foreign brib-
ery.40 The DOJ adopted this practice under the belief that the
most powerful deterrent to bribery is prison time for corporate
officers. Numerous DOJ officers have opined that “the prospect of
significant prison sentences for individuals should make clear to
every corporate executive, every board member, and every sales
agent that we will seek to hold you personally accountable for
FCPA violations.”41
Accordingly, the DOJ and the SEC zealously devised a plan to
hold corporate officers accountable for FCPA violations. The DOJ
strategically partnered with the Internal Revenue Service’s
(“IRS”) Crimes Division as well as the U.S. Attorney’s office.42
Moreover, in 2009 the SEC authorized a separate FCPA-violations
division that would “focus on new and proactive approaches to
identifying violations by being more proactive in investigations,
working more closely with [its] foreign counterparts, and taking a
more global approach to these violations.”43
Some believe this unprecedented resurgence in enforcement
is indirectly a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”).44 To com-
ply with SOX, corporate officers must conduct internal investiga-
tions and publish their findings to the SEC or DOJ to gain
leniency for any wrongdoing.45 Such internal investigations, as
one may expect, have led to the discovery of FCPA violations.46
Others find that the issues surrounding the enforcement of the
39. Bixby, supra note 2, at 111; see STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 81 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that
prior to 1994 there had been no incarcerations relating to FCPA violations).
40. Bixby, supra note 2, at 111.
41. Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389, 404 (2010) (citing Lanny A. Breuer,
Assistant Attorney General); see also Drury D. Stevenson & Nicolas J. Wagoner,
FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to Debar, FORDHAM L. REV. 775, 794 n.130 (2011) (citing
former FCPA chief prosecutor, Mark Mendelsohn, who stated that the increased
number of individual prosecutions is intentional because “to have a credible deterrent
effect, people have to go to jail”).
42. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 41, at 784.
43. Id.
44. 18 U.S.C § 1514A (2010).
45. CASSIN, supra note 20, at 11; Priya Cherian Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions:
Liability Trend to Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2008); Bixby, supra note 2, at
116; Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 41, at 787 (“The DOJ and SEC, realizing the
incentive-altering force of massive sanctions, have parlayed a handful of highly
publicized multi-million dollar prosecutions into many more self-disclosures by
companies hoping for more lenient sentencing.”).
46. Bixby, supra note 2, at 116.
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FCPA, such as the “appropriateness of legislating morals,” disap-
peared with the corrupt corporate culture of the 1990s.47
The issue faced by companies and agents as a result of
increased enforcement of the FCPA is the lack of guidance pro-
vided by both the DOJ and the courts as to interpreting the
FCPA’s provisions. The DOJ has notoriously provided companies
with limited guidance regarding FCPA compliance.48 The DOJ is
generally uncomfortable with issuing advisory opinions to compa-
nies because such preemptory guidance is unique to the DOJ.49 As
of December 22, 2011, the DOJ had only issued one opinion for the
2011 calendar year.50 One may, therefore, deduce that so few opin-
ions were issued because companies found the opinions unhelpful
and disconcerting.51
Companies, which find divulging sensitive information to be
risky, are uncomfortable with the opinion process.52 There are
FCPA provisions that corroborate this fear. Notably, the DOJ will
only respond to prospective transactions rather than hypotheti-
cals.53 Moreover, the opinions only bind the DOJ and the request-
ing party; however, the SEC is not bound to the opinion.54 If the
DOJ’s opinion concludes that the requesting party’s actions did
not violate the FCPA, the opinion only creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the requesting company did not violate the FCPA.55
The DOJ can still overcome such a presumption and prosecute the
requesting party for the given action upon which it based its opin-
47. Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action:
Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 286-87
(2007) (citations omitted).
48. Comm. on Int’l Bus. Transactions, The FCPA and its Impact on International
Business Transactions – Should Anything be Done Minimize the Consequences of the
U.S.’s Unique Position on Combating Offshore Corruption?, N.Y. CITY B ASS’N 19
(2011), available at http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/FCPAImpacton
InternationalBusinessTransactions.pdf (noting that one of the needs to improve the
FCPA is to alter the DOJ’s opinion writing function).
49. James R. Doty, Toward A Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in
Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 1233, 1238 (2007).
50. See Opinion Procedure Release from the United States Dep’t of Justice Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Review (Jun. 30, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/opinion/.
51. Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law Against
Foreign Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International Lawyer, 5
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, n. 101 (2006) (citations omitted).
52. Doty, supra note 49, at 1238.
53. Colares, supra note 51, at 15.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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ion by the preponderance of evidence.56 Moreover, since the opin-
ion only binds the DOJ to the party who requests the opinion, the
opinion’s utility for other companies is in question.57
Many of the FCPA’s critics agree with the aims of the FCPA.
Many, in fact, consider the principles behind the FCPA as impera-
tive to an American business’s ability to thrive in foreign mar-
kets.58 The business community, however, is acutely aware that
inherent ambiguities in the FCPA make it difficult and costly to
abide by.59
The courts have added to the confusion by playing a minimal
role in interpreting the FCPA’s provisions. The courts’ lack of par-
ticipation can be partly attributed to businesses’ desire to avoid
court proceedings.60 While individuals have challenged FCPA vio-
lations in the courts, companies would rather pay substantial
fines to avoid corruption charges and the resultant reputational
impact.61 As a result of this desire to avoid trial, companies have
indirectly given prosecutors “unchecked authority to define the
contours of FCPA liability.”62
II. AMBIGUITIES WITHIN THE FCPA:
AMBIGUOUS BUT NOT VAGUE
There are numerous ambiguities within the FCPA that place
unwary businesses in danger of indictment and sanctions.63 Nev-
ertheless, courts have steadfastly held that the FCPA is not so
ambiguous to render it constitutionally vague. In U.S. v. Kay, the
defendants, David Kay and Douglas Murphy, were president and
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Doty, supra note 49, at 1239 (“U.S. business interests benefit by the
strengthening of legal institutions that counter the pressures of state-sponsored (or
state-condoned) corruption.”).
59. Allen R. Brooks, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-Prosecution
Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 137, 155 (2010).
60. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 41, at 786 (“[M]ost companies have chosen
to sweep charges under the rug by entering into a plea agreement.”).
61. Koehler, supra note 41, at 406 (“In fact, no business entity has publicly
challenged either enforcement agency in an FCPA case in the last twenty years.”)
(citations omitted).
62. Marceau, supra note 47, at 287; Hearings, supra note 18, at 1-2 (statement of
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security).
63. See Doty, supra note 49, at 1239 (“[I]n the entire canon of FCPA law there is
little judicial development of the concept of ‘corruptly’ and no administrative
definition of ‘facilitating payment.’”) (citations omitted).
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vice-president of American Rice, Inc. (“ARI”), which exported rice
to Haiti, among other countries.64 The Haitian government levied
taxes and duties on rice importers.65 Both Kay and Murphy took
steps to reduce these costs by purchasing licenses from govern-
ment officials that designated ARI as a charity. This designation
resulted in ARI not having to pay the applicable duty. Also, ARI
paid government officials to give them a “service corporation”
license that allowed it to avoid paying duties by claiming that it
did not own the rice it imported.66
While the defendants did not deny bribing Haitian officials,
they argued the “untested” defense that the FCPA was too vague
and ambiguous to apply to hold them criminally liable.67 The
defendants argued that the FCPA fails to provide businesses clear
warning of violations.68 The defendants further argued that
because the FCPA does not specifically state that payments to
lower taxes or duties are not related to obtaining or retaining bus-
iness, the statute should be found void for vagueness.69
Although the Fifth Circuit agreed with the defendants that
the FCPA failed to define the point at which a payment given to a
foreign official is in consideration for the retention or continuation
of business,70 it held that the FCPA is not vague, thereby uphold-
ing the defendant’s conviction.71 The court concluded that the
FCPA maintains seven standards that are likely to lead to convic-
tion, and all of the standards are “reasonably clear so as to allow
the common interpreter to understand their meaning.”72 Brushing
aside the defendant’s vagueness argument, the Fifth Circuit noted
that the defendants merely “raised a technical interpretive ques-
tion as to the exact meaning of ‘obtaining or retaining business.’”
rather than setting forth a vagueness defense.73 While agreeing
that the FCPA contains many ambiguities, the Fifth Circuit ulti-
64. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2007).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. CASSIN, supra note 20, at 39 (citing Kay, 513 F.3d at 440).
68. Id. at 38-39.
69. Id.
70. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d at 442 n. 11 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing U.S. v. Kay,
359 F.3d 738, 744, 746-47 (5th Cir. 2004)) (questioning the “linkage [ ] between the
effects of that which is sought from the foreign official in consideration of a bribe
(here, tax minimization) and the briber’s goal of finding assistance or obtaining or
retaining foreign business with or for some person, and still satisfy[ing] the business
nexus element of the FCPA?”).
71. Kay, 513 F.3d at 442.
72. Id. at 441.
73. Id.
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mately decided that the FCPA is not so vague that the defendants
were not “reasonably aware” that the payments they made to Hai-
tian officials to lower their tax burden through misrepresentation
were unlawful under the statute.74
Overall, Kay’s significance could be that “hairsplitters
[should] beware . . . the FCPA means what it says.”75 Commenta-
tors have noted that alleged FCPA ambiguities are merely con-
trived from the lawyers’ need to “quibble”;76 many judges and
juries do not have trouble understanding the FCPA.77 On the other
hand, other commentators have described Kay as “equivocal,”78
noting that the Fifth Circuit’s 2004 Kay decision, which found that
the defendant’s actions did not necessarily violate the FCPA.79 The
Fifth Circuit posited that the defendant’s actions are not consid-
ered obtaining or retaining business because reducing customs or
tax duties could be described as innocently increasing a company’s
profitability.80 Putting aside the legal arguments, the Kay decision
emboldened the DOJ and the SEC to actively increase enforce-
ment actions.81
A. Who Is a Foreign Official?
The question as to who qualifies as a foreign official has
plagued many attorneys and their clients and has resulted in
cases with controversial outcomes. Of all the FCPA’s noted vagar-
ies,82 some argue that the term “foreign official” is the most ambig-
uous.83 Attempting to define a foreign official in the context of the
FCPA necessarily involves defining the term “instrumentality.”84
The relevant section of the FCPA prohibits an individual from
making a payment to a foreign official that
induces such foreign official, political party, party official,
74. Id.
75. CASSIN, supra note 20, at 41.
76. Richard L. Cassin, We Get It, FCPA BLOG (Sept. 17, 2009, 8:28 PM), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/9/18/we-get-it.html.
77. Id.
78. Koehler, supra note 41, at 393.
79. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 2004).
80. Koehler, supra note 41, at 393.
81. Mike Koehler, The Fac¸ade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 918
(2010) [hereinafter Koehler, Fac¸ade].
82. See Doty, supra note 49, at 1239 (“in the entire canon of FCPA law there is
little judicial development of the concept of ‘corruptly’ and no administrative
definition of ‘facilitating payment.’”).
83. Koehler, Fac¸ade, supra note 81, at 961.
84. Brooks, supra note 59, at 143-44.
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or candidate to use his or its influence with a foreign gov-
ernment or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence
any act or decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining busi-
ness for or with, or directing business to, any person.85
Thus, an employee of an instrumentality will be considered a
foreign official, once an instrumentality of the government is prop-
erly defined.86 Unlike other statutes,87 the FCPA does not explic-
itly define instrumentality,88 which has left the government
without restraint in categorizing foreign individuals as foreign
officials. Although the statute only applies to bribing foreign offi-
cials, the lack of clarity has resulted in the “foreign official ele-
ment simply mean[ing] what the enforcement agencies say it
means.”89 The FCPA defines a foreign official as follows:
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a pub-
lic international organization, or any person acting in an
official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf
of any such public international organization.90
Until recently, the DOJ and courts have provided little guidance
as to the type of employees that constitute a foreign official. The
DOJ has stated that whether an employee is considered a foreign
official will be broadly construed.91 An example of such a broad
construction can be found in United States v. Young & Rubicam,
Inc.92 In Rubicam, the defendant paid two men to use their influ-
ence over members of the Jamaican Tourist Board, although
neither man worked for the Jamaican Tourist Board.93 The gov-
ernment predicated its argument on the fact that “the term ‘for-
eign official’ as defined in the FCPA has a meaning broader than
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(B) (1998) (emphasis added).
86. Brooks, supra note 59, at 143.
87. United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *7
(C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (“[i]n the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (‘FSIA’),
Congress expressly defined an ‘agency or instrumentality’ to include state-owned
enterprises.”).
88. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
89. Koehler, supra note 41, at 410.
90. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
91. Brown, supra note 11, at 4-5 n.15; Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland, Adam P.
Wolf, Under the FCPA, Who Is A Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1250
(2008).
92.  741 F. Supp. 334, 334 (D. Conn. 1990).
93. Id.
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the ordinary meaning of the phrase.”94 Under the broad interpre-
tation employed in Rubicam, the DOJ may consider any person
who works for a company, from the chief executive to a mailroom
clerk, to be a foreign official.95 Thus, this unchecked interpretation
of the “foreign official” element contributes to the recent rise in
FCPA enforcement.96
Whether the DOJ and the SEC are taking advantage of these
vagaries to increase their enforcement of the FCPA is a controver-
sial topic. Both critics and supporters of the FCPA can point to
numerous sources that justify current FCPA enforcement activity.
The philosophical battle regarding whether a state-owned entity
is, or can ever be, considered an instrumentality is another issue
because both critics and proponents can cite the congressional leg-
islative history to supports their positions. The FCPA’s critics note
that the limited role played by the courts in interpreting the
FCPA has allowed regulators broadened power, which conflicts
with Congress’s legislative intent, to favor lenity towards the
defendant.97
Moreover, the critics argue that the statute places a specific
limit on the individuals that are to be considered “foreign officials”
and the types of entities considered “instrumentalities.” The stat-
ute specifically states that a foreign official is considered an
“employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof. . . .”98 The FCPA, therefore, notes that an
“instrumentality” can be a government entity outside of a depart-
ment or agency. The determination of whether an entity is an
instrumentality, however, is limited to those entities where the
government has majority ownership.99 Thus, many critics believe
94. Id. at 353.
95. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 18, at 21-23 (statement of Hon. Michael
Mukasey, former Att’y Gen. of the United States, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton
LLP).
96. Koehler, Fac¸ade, supra note 81, at 917.
97. Doty, supra note 49, at 1255 (“[w]ithout Reg. FCPA and the administrative
apparatus it implies, there is a policy vacuum in which law is developed on an ad hoc
basis by Assistant U.S. Attorneys and by the Staff of the SEC and DOJ as they
respond to the exigencies of particular factual situations.”); see H. Lowell Brown, The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux: The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 12 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 260, 270-71 (1994) (“it should be
anticipated that prosecutors and the courts will be expansive in their construction of
“foreign official” in enforcing the FCPA.”); Veronica Foley & Catina Haynes, The
FCPA and Its Impact in Latin America, CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., 27, 29 (2009);
Cohen et al., supra note 91, at 1267.
98. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A).
99. Cohen et al., supra note 91, at 1258-59.
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that an entity must be “majority-owned or dominantly con-
trolled. . .[to be an]. . .instrumentality” of that government.100
On the other hand, the proponents of the reinvigorated FCPA
cite legislative history that justifies the broad interpretation of
“instrumentality” and “foreign official.” The amended versions of
the FCPA broadened the jurisdiction and scope of the DOJ. In
1988 Congress expanded the definition of foreign official to even
include those government employees who did ministerial or cleri-
cal work.101 Additionally, the 1999 amendments102 provide support
to those who argue that the term “instrumentality” was meant to
be interpreted broadly because they stipulate that the FCPA
should follow the definitions established by the Organization for
Economic and Cooperation Development’s (“OECD”) in the “Inter-
national Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
cials in International Business Transactions [International
Convention].”103  The OECD created the International Convention
to provide a solution for transnational bribery and other related
concerns.104 The convention broadly defined a foreign official as
follows:
[A]ny person holding a legislative, administrative or judi-
cial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or
elected; any person exercising a public function for a for-
eign country, including for a public agency or public enter-
prise; and any official or agent of a public international
organization.105
In response, Congress amended the FCPA through the Inter-
national Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act.106 Although Con-
gress failed to adopt the OECD’s “foreign official” definition,
comments made during its passing indicated that the FCPA will
be interpreted so as to be consistent with the OECD.107 Because
100. Id. at 1245.
101. Fremantle & Katz, supra note 38, at 761-62; Brown, supra note 11, at 5 n.15
(noting that the term “foreign official” did not include “employees whose duties were
primarily ministerial or clerical”).
102. See, generally, S. Rep. No. 105-277, at *1 (1998).
103. Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 129, 140-41 (2010).
104. Id. at 139.
105. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., CONVENTION ON COMBATTING BRIBERY
OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Apr. 1997),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf.
106. Carrington, supra note 103, at 139.
107. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at *2 (1998), reprinted in BUSINESS LAWS INC., FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REPORTER app. D (2d ed. 2008) (“[t]hird, the OECD
Convention includes officials of public international organizations within the
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the OECD’s definition of “public official” encompasses employees
of a state-owned corporation, the FCPA necessarily adopted this
definition as well.108 The OECD’s International Convention
focuses the “foreign official” inquiry on the “function and conduct”
of an employee. This focus does not create a clear means to deter-
mine whether the employee is a foreign official.109 As a result,
defendants in enforcement actions like Lindsey and Carson now
find themselves in a perfect storm: under the auspices of a benign
and relatively unclear statute, which is subject to little judicial
oversight, and a DOJ eager to enforce it against them.
B. Aguilar
Lindsey Manufacturing Company is a privately owned U.S.
company that manufactures emergency restoration systems.110 A
large number of Lindsey’s clients were foreign, state-owned com-
panies.111 Lindsey obtained the aid of Grupo Internacional De
Asesores S.A. (“Grupo”) as sales liaisons to Latin America.112 The
government alleged that Lindsey hired defendant Enrique Agui-
lar, director of Grupo, because of his “close personal relationship”
with an official in Mexico’s wholly state-owned utility company,113
Comisio´n Federal de Electricidad (“CFE”).114 The contract between
Aguilar and Lindsey not only provided Aguilar with a thirty per-
cent commission for goods sold to the CFE, but also acknowledged
that one percent of that thirty percent commission would be used
to pay bribes to CFE officials who aided in obtaining the con-
tracts.115 Lindsey attempted to conceal the illicit thirty-percent
price increase by having Aguilar create false invoices that claimed
the excess money received was for commissions and services.116
The government further claimed that Lindsey shifted the bribe
costs to CFE by increasing its goods and services prices by thirty
percent.117
definition of “public official.” Accordingly, the bill similarly expands the FCPA
definition of public officials to include officials of such organizations.”).
108. Id.
109. Cohen et al., supra note 91, at 1260.
110. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1109.
114. Id. at 1111.
115. Id.
116. First Superseding Indictment at Count 1(B)-(C), United States v. Aguilar,
2010 WL 4316920, (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2010).
117. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
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With this contract in place, Aguilar commissioned his wife,
Angela Aguilar, Grupo’s financial director, to bribe CFE officials
to obtain contracts on Lindsey’s behalf.118 CFE paid Lindsey for its
services by distributing money into Grupo’s brokerage account
located at Global Financial.119 Angela and Enrique Aguilar would
then withdraw money from the brokerage account to bribe CFE
officials.120 Under these orders, Grupo allegedly bribed CFE’s cur-
rent and former Directors of Operations, Nestor Moreno,121 by pay-
ing his personal American Express card beginning in July 2006,
purchasing him an eighty-two foot yacht worth over $1.8 mil-
lion,122 a Ferrari Spyder worth $297,500, and insurance for said
car,123 and making other payments from a Swiss bank account to
Moreno’s half-brother.124 Grupo also allegedly bribed Arturo Her-
nandez, who was CFE’s Director of Operations until 2007,125 by
disbursing funds from Grupo’s Global Account to Hernandez’s rel-
atives.126 Grupo concealed the improper payments by stating that
such payments were compensating Hernandez’s relatives for
services.127
1. The Decision
The court begins its analysis by providing the relevant FCPA
section and noting that the FCPA “does not define instrumental-
ity.”128 After defining the applicable subsections, the court pro-
vides information about the Mexican government’s constitutional
obligation to supply power and electricity to citizens and the
CFE’s role in carrying out this function.129  In so doing, the court
stresses the relationship that CFE has with the government by
noting that the statute that created the CFE defines it as “a
decentralized public entity with legal personality and its own pat-
rimony.”130 The CFE’s governing board consists of various govern-
118. Id.
119. First Superseding Indictment at Count 1(B)(3)(c), Aguilar, 2010 WL 4316920.
120. Id. at Count 1(B)(3)(g).
121. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1109-10 (also showing that Mr. Moreno served as
the Sub–Director of Generation for CFE in 2002 and became the Director of
Operations in 2007).
122. First Superseding Indictment at Count 1(C)(6), Aguilar, 2010 WL 4316920.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1111.
126. First Superseding Indictment at Count 7(C)(6), Aguilar, 2010 WL 4316920.
127. Id.
128. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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ment officials, and the President of Mexico appoints the CFE’s
Director General.131 Moreover, the CFE’s own website describes
itself as a “government agency [that is] owned by the Mexican
government.”132
The court provides the defendant’s various arguments that
attempt to prove that Congress did not intend for the FCPA to
punish payments made to state-owned corporations.133 The court
begins by noting that statutory interpretation mandates looking
at the “language of the statute.”134  The court notes that the term
instrumentality “inherently [has a] broad scope,” but defeats the
defendant’s argument using the defendant’s own suggested
“instrumentality” definition.135 Using the defendant’s instrumen-
tality definition,136 the court finds that the defendants incorrectly
use two canons of statutory interpretation to arrive at their con-
clusion.137 The defendant’s first argument relies on noscitur a
sociis, wherein “words are to be judged by their context and that
words in a series are to be understood by neighboring words in the
series.”138 The defendants argue that when defining “foreign offi-
cial,” the FCPA restricts a foreign official to those “officer[s] or
employee[s] of a foreign government or any department, agency,
or instrumentality thereof.”139 Therefore, the defendant’s argu-
ment restricts an instrumentality to the characteristics of those
government branches specifically mentioned.140
The court notes that the defendant’s other argument relies on
ejusdem generis, wherein “general words follow specific words in a
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumer-
ated by the preceding specific words.”141 The defendant argues
that “instrumentality,” a general word, refers to the government,
a specific word, and those institutions used by the government to
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1113.
134. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
135. Id.
136. Id. (“the ordinary meaning of instrumentality is ‘the quality or state of being
instrumental,’ which, in turn, means ‘serving as a means or agency: implemental,’ or
‘of, relating to, or done with an instrument or tool.”).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1113 n.5 (citing United States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 740-41 (9th Cir.
2001)).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 h(2)(A).
140. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1113.
141. Id. at 1113 n.5 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15
(2001)).
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“accomplish its functions of setting forth and administering public
policy or public affairs or exercising political authority.”142 The
defendant considers the functions of these government entities to
be static. They argue that because corporations assume various
forms and serve various purposes, state-owned corporations
should not be considered an instrumentality of the state.143 Moreo-
ver, state-owned corporations are not instrumentalities of the
state because state-owned corporations “lack uniformity” regard-
ing their formation and operation.  The court then reduces the
defendant’s argument regarding the ability of a state-owned
entity to be an instrumentality to the following syllogism: “as a
matter of law no state-owned corporation is an instrumentality.”
Thus, no CFE employee can be a foreign official.144
The court further notes that the defendant’s logic regarding a
state-owned entity’s ability to constitute an instrumentality is
necessarily flawed because such state-owned entities share many
of the same characteristics as agencies and departments. The
court posits broad and defining characteristics145 of departments
and agencies, and concludes that the CFE possesses all of these
characteristics.146 The court continues its analysis by reviewing
arguments set forth by the government and the defendant about
how the term “instrumentality” relates to the congressional pur-
pose for enacting the FCPA.147 The court considers the defense’s
argument that the congressional history demonstrates that the
FCPA is focused on “government and politics.”148 The defendant
notes that Congress could have criminalized all bribery payments
made abroad, but it failed to do so.149 Thus, the defendant argues
that the FCPA should be construed narrowly solely as it relates to
“bribery on governmental affairs.”150
142. Id. at 1114.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1112.
145. Id. at 1115 (“The entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in many
cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction; The key officers and directors of the
entity are, or are appointed by, government officials; The entity is financed, at least in
large measure, through governmental appropriations or through revenues obtained
as a result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or royalties, such as entrance
fees to a national park; The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling
power to administer its designated functions; The entity is widely perceived and
understood to be performing official (i.e., governmental) functions.”).
146. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115
147. Id. at 1116.
148. Id. at 1115.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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The state, on the other hand, argues that the FCPA should be
construed broadly. The State argues that the defendant’s interpre-
tation of the statute would violate the Charming Betsy doctrine,
which stipulates that statutes should not be construed in a man-
ner that conflicts with international law or U.S. international
agreements.151 Specifically, the state argues that the defendant’s
actions violate the OECD, and Congress amended the FCPA to
adopt the OECD.152 Thus, because the OECD defines a public
enterprise as “any enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over
which a government, or governments, may, directly or indirectly,
exercise a dominant influence,” an employee who exercises influ-
ence over such an enterprise should be deemed a foreign public
official.153 Additionally, the State argues that Congress amended
the FCPA “to conform it to the requirements of and implement the
OECD Convention.”154
The final step in the court’s analysis to determine the scope of
an “instrumentality” necessitates an analysis of the FCPA’s legis-
lative history.155 After hearing persuasive arguments from both
the defendant and government, the court finds the legislative his-
tory “inconclusive.”156 The court notes that it is obvious that Con-
gress did not intend for all state-owned corporations to fall under
the FCPA but did intend that some state-owned corporations be
excluded.157
Attempting to glean Congress’s intent, the court then poses a
hypothetical: the payments made were illegal and supplies many
details corresponding with the current case.158 Because the person
receiving the payments was an employee of a state-owned entity,
the court asks the lead defense attorney whether Congress would
tell the DOJ not to prosecute the hypothetical person under the
FCPA.159 The attorney replies that the answer would depend on
whether the legislator was on the campaign trail or given “truth
serum.”160 This equivocal reply demonstrates to the court that
Congress must have intended to criminalize such behavior even if
151. Id. at 1116 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64,
117-18, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804)).
152.  Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
153. Id.
154. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 105-277, at *2 (1998), 1998 WL 438894, at *2).
155. Id. at 1117.
156. Id. at 1119.
157. Id.
158. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1119.
159. Id. at 1120.
160. Id.
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a business entity is a state-owned corporation.161 The court ulti-
mately decides, based on the attorney responses to the written
hypothetical, that Congress intended to make the alleged actions
of the defendant illegal.162 Thus, the court denies the defendant’s
motion to dismiss.163
2. Providing Guidance
Aguilar is an influential case because it is the first published
case that touches on the state-owned corporation and instrumen-
tality issue within the FCPA, but it does little to aid the business
community. The factors listed by District Judge Matz to deter-
mine whether an entity is an instrumentality of the state were
similarly listed by the DOJ in its review of the OECD in 1999.164
However, the Aguilar court, unlike the DOJ, hints at a presump-
tion that a state-owned corporation will be considered an instru-
mentality.165 The DOJ limits its opinion by noting that only in
“appropriate circumstances” will state-owned corporations be gov-
ernment instrumentalities.166 The “instrumentality” and “foreign
official” opinions have at least finally given FCPA critics some
form of judicial guidance.
Indeed, the Aguilar opinion capped a recently active judicial
outburst in defining “instrumentality” and “foreign official.”167 The




164. Cohen et al., supra note 91, at 1254 (“[s]tate-owned businesses may, in
appropriate circumstances, be considered instrumentalities of a foreign government
and their officers and employees to be foreign officials. Among the factors that [the
DOJ] considers are the foreign state’s own characterization[sic] of the enterprise and
its employees, i.e. whether it prohibits and prosecutes bribery of the enterprise’s
employees as public corruption, the purpose of the enterprise, and the degree of
control exercised over the enterprise by the foreign government.”).
165. The Aguilar court provided a non-exclusive list of factors and noted that a
company only needs to evince “some” of the characteristics to be considered an
instrumentality. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1115.
166. Cohen et al., supra note 91, at 1254.
167. Prior to 2008 there had been only one published opinion even mentioning
payments made to foreign officials. Cohen et al., supra note 91, at 1257; see also
Michael Volkov, What is an ‘Instrumentality’ Thereof? Let’s Keep It Real, THE FCPA
BLOG (Mar. 9, 2011, 7:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/3/9/what-is-an-
instrumentality-thereof-lets-keep-it-real.html (noting that the recent number of cases
asking the court to interpret the FCPA’s ambiguous instrumentality provision is a
“welcome development” that will indeed aid businesses) (last visited November 13,
2011); Hearings, supra note 18, at 63 (statement of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen. of the United States, Criminal Division) (noting that the DOJ provided
guidance in defining a foreign official. Mr. Andres also noted that the courts have
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cial” first appeared in U.S. v. Esquenazi.168 Esquenazi169 involves a
Florida-based telecommunications company funneling more than
$800,000 through shell companies to pay bribes to officials in
Haiti’s state-owned telecommunications company, Haiti Teleco.170
The trial judge denied the defendant’s “foreign official” argument
without issuing an opinion.171  Although the Aguilar court finally
addressed the issue of state-owned corporations, Aguilar leaves
much to be desired.
First, Aguilar’s applicability to other situations is arguable
because subsequent information provided to the court reveals that
the CFE is a “decentralized public entity.”172 Since the CFE has
always been a public entity, the court’s findings state the obvious:
the CFE shares a sufficient amount of characteristics with an
agency or department because it is an official agency. Second, the
courts have only addressed those state corporations that are
wholly-owned by the state. Although the court admits that there
are limitations as to the types of entities that can be considered an
instrumentality, the courts do not define these limitations.173
Thus, it is unclear how business leaders must act to comply with
the FCPA in the event that a company is partially-owned by a gov-
ernment. Perhaps mirroring the unprecedented number of FCPA
cases, less than a month later the same court issued another writ-
ten opinion concerning “instrumentality” and “foreign official” in
U.S. v. Carson.174
recently provided practitioners with multiple decisions on this topic in addition to the
statutory definition.).
168. Richard L. Cassin, Foreign Official Challenge on Appeal, THE FCPA BLOG,
(May 14, 2012, 7:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/5/14/foreign-offical-
challenge-on-appeal.html [hereinafter Cassin, Esquenazi].
169. Indictment at *1, United States v. Esquenazi. 09-CR-21010-JEM (S.D. Fla
Dec. 4, 2009).
170. Press Release, Department of Justice, Two Florida Executives, One Florida
Intermediary and Two Former Haitian Government Officials Indicted for Their
Alleged Participation in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Dec. 7, 2009), available at http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/December/09-crm-1307.html.
171. Cassin, Esquenazi, supra note 168.
172. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1120. (C.D. Cal. 2011).
Moreover, the Aguilar opinion has been tainted since Judge Matz dismissed the
convictions of Lindsey and Lee due to prosecution misconduct including “providing
false information to get a search warrant, making unauthorized searches and giving
incorrect testimony to a grand jury.” Edvard Pettersson, Lindsey Manufacturing
Judge Tentatively Dismisses Executives’ Bribery Case, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-29/lindsey-manufacturing-judge-
tentatively-dismisses-executives-bribery-case.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
173. See Hearings, supra note 18, at 20, 26-28 (statement of Michael Mukasey).
174. United States v. Carson, SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 7416975, at *12 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
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In U.S. v. Carson,175 the court further refined the totality-of-
the-circumstances approach advocated in Aguilar and provided
answers to questions left open by the Aguilar court. In Carson a
grand jury indicted the defendants176 for alleged bribery payments
made by Controlled Components, Inc. (“CCI”), a business that
manufactured “control valves for the use in the nuclear, oil, gas,
and power generation industr[y].”177 Between 2003-2007, CCI
allegedly paid $4.9 million in bribes to its state-owned company
customers in China, Korea, and the United Arab Emirates.178 The
government alleged that the Carson defendants knowingly
decided to make improper payments to bribe officials by transfer-
ring money from the company’s U.S. bank account to another
bank account.179
Like the defendants in Aguilar, the Carson defendants
argued that employees of state-owned entities can “never” be con-
sidered a foreign official, and, the issue of whether a state-owned
corporation is an instrumentality of the state is a question of law
that can be decided by the court.180 The court, however, concluded
that whether a state-owned entity is an instrumentality of the
state is a question of fact, and “simply assuming that a company is
wholly owned by the state is insufficient for the Court to deter-
mine as a matter of law whether the company constitutes a gov-
ernment instrumentality.”181 As the Aguilar court explained,
government ownership of a business entity is but one variable in
deciding whether that business is indeed an instrumentality.182
Moreover, the court found that the following non-exhaustive fac-
tors should be considered in determining whether a business
entity is a government instrumentality:
(1)The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its
employees; (2)The foreign state’s degree of control over the
entity; (3)The purpose of the entity’s activities; (4)The
175. See id.
176. Id. at 1 (naming Stuart Carson, Hong “Rose” Carson, Paul Congrove, and
David Edmonds as defendants).
177. Id. at 2.
178. Id..
179. Indictment at *15-28, United States v. Carson, SACR 09-00077-JVS (C.D. Cal
May, 5, 2011), 2009 WL 1043797.
180. United States v. Carson, SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 7416975, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
181. Id. at 5.
182. United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting
that the government’s sole ownership of a corporation is but one factor in determining
whether the business is an instrumentality).
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entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign state’s
law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive or
controlling power to administer its designated functions;
(5)The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation;
and (6)The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity,
including the level of financial support by the state (e.g.,
subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans.)183
Similar to the Aguilar court, Judge Selna’s non-exhaustive list
presented businesses with the same problems when trying to
operate in a foreign territory: the list provided little guidance as to
how to comply with the FCPA.184
The Carson court nevertheless attempted to clarify when a
state-owned entity is an “instrumentality.” Diverging from the
Aguilar court, Carson offered a more general guide, observing that
a government’s “mere monetary investment” in a business does
not make that business an “instrumentality.”185 The court declared
that there must be “additional factors that objectively indicate”
that the business at issue is used as a means to accomplish “gov-
ernmental objectives.”186
To do so, the court cited numerous historical examples where
corporations have been used to carry out governmental functions
such as the first and second banks of the United States.187 The
court stressed that among numerous historical examples, the gov-
ernment’s control over these enterprises varies, with some of the
corporations having even been involved with the “commercial sale
of goods and services.”188 The court notes, however, that the over-
arching quality among all of the state-owned corporations is that
they “further[ed] the policy interests of the federal government.”189
The court concluded that a state-owned entity that has a commer-
183. Carson, 2011 WL 7416975, at *5.
184. See, supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
185. Carson, 2011 WL 7416975, at *7. This point made by the court seems to be in
response to the many FCPA defense attorneys and detractors who argue that under
this broad definition of instrumentality employed by the DOJ, the various American
car manufacturers would now qualify as an instrumentality of the state after the
massive bailout. Hearings, supra note 18, at 71 (statement of Greg Andres, Deputy
Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States, Criminal Division).
186. Carson, 2011 WL 7416975, at *7.
187. Id. at 7-8. The court also listed the Panama Railroad Company, United States
Grain Corporation, the War Finance Corporation for World War I, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the United
States Spruce Production Corporation. Id. at 9.
188. Id. at 9.
189. Id. (citing Optiperu, S.A. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 420, 424
(D.D.C. 1986)).
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cial purpose can still be an instrumentality of the government.190
While the Carson court expounded upon the Aguilar court’s
definition of instrumentality, the definition it provided still fails to
define what constitutes a government instrumentality and who
may be considered a foreign official.191 The Carson court merely
reaffirms that state-owned entities can be considered an instru-
mentality and notes that a government must have more than just
a monetary interest and the entity in question must serve some
government purpose.192 A more ominous sign for businesses is that
the Carson court does not deem the term “instrumentality to be an
ambiguous concept.”193 The court implies that businesses will, and
should, determine from a non-exhaustive list of various factors
whether a state-owned entity is an instrumentality.194
Simply providing businesses with a non-exhaustive list of fac-
tors fails to guide them as to FCPA compliance.195 Most businesses
make operational decisions on a cost-benefit analysis. If busi-
nesses cannot determine the risk associated with doing business
in a foreign country, then the business may abstain from doing
so.196 Because businesses are creatures of cost benefit-analysis,197
lack of guidance actually deters businesses from developing com-
pliance programs,198 which may then lead to harsher sanctions.199
190. Id.
191. Hearings, supra note 18, at 28 (statement of Michael Mukasey) (noting that
Carson and Aguilar conceded that there were limits to the definition of an
instrumentality but that both courts provided a clear definition).
192. United States v. Carson, SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 7416975, at *12. (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2011).
193. Id. at 11.
194. Id.
195. Hearings, supra, note 18, at 28 (statement of Michael Mukasey) (“[i]f the
definitions of these fundamental statutory terms vary by circumstance and by case,
and therefore have to be decided by a jury rather than as a matter of law, it becomes
impossible for companies to figure out in advance what conduct may and may not
provide a meaningful risk of violating the FCPA.”).
196. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 41, at 803.
197. Id.; Hearings, supra note 18, at 37 (statement of George J. Terwilliger, III,
Partner, White & Case LLP) (noting that the new enforcement regime associated with
the ambiguous FCPA has resulted in business’s decision to abstain from international
commerce, which has had a detrimental effect on the economy).
198. Hearings, supra note 18, at 20 (statement of Hon. Michael Mukasey, former
Att’y Gen. of the United States, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP) (noting that the
lack of a clear definition for instrumentality and foreign official “makes it difficult for
companies to focus their monitoring and compliance programs on clearly identifiable
situations involving foreign officials and foreign instrumentalities.”).
199. CASSIN, supra note 20, at 23 (noting that an “effective compliance program”
can result in a mitigation of up to 95% of the normal penalties”) (citations omitted);
Huskins, supra note 45, at 1447 (noting that a multinationals “don’t ask, don’t tell
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If a business cannot determine the risk of prosecution, then the
business will not be able to implement an effective compliance
program to educate its staff about the FCPA, thereby failing to
meet the FCPA’s goal: compliance.200
Although business leaders advocate for changes to the FCPA
so that a state-owned corporation is considered an instrumentality
when the foreign government owns a majority share of the state-
owned corporation,201 there is evidence that setting such an arbi-
trary standard would be harmful.202 Moreover, four U.S. district
courts have already refused such a bright-line test.203 Although
business leaders clamor for additional guidance regarding how to
abide by the FCPA, the same conditions still exist that stop the
courts from providing this guidance: businesses are choosing to
pay hefty settlements rather than face corruption charges and liti-
gation.204 While the courts continue to sit on the sidelines, the DOJ
and SEC have extended the reach of the term “instrumentality” to
include those entities where a state is a minority shareholder.205
Moreover, the scope of the SEC and DOJ’s instrumentality defini-
tion could possibly extend to all levels of a foreign country’s prod-
uct-manufacturing operation, which will necessarily render those
employees foreign officials.206
In the context of Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence,
policy” regarding FCPA violations will act as an aggravating factor in determining
punishment); Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara Altenbaumer-Price, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Minefield for Directors, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 145, 180 (2011)
(concluding that the failure of corporate officers to become experts in the FCPA and
developing a compliance program could lead to sanctions for the company and
criminal charges as well); Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 613 (noting that with the
recent trend of the FCPA, a FCPA compliance program “should be standard
practice”).
200. Blue, supra note 22, at 23-24.
201. Hearings, supra note 18, at 20 (statement of Hon. Michael Mukasey, former
Att’y Gen. of the United States, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP).
202. Hearings, supra note 18, at 71 (statement of Greg Andres, Deputy Assistant
Att’y Gen. of the United States, Criminal Division) (noting that ownership needs to be
one of many factors to be considered when determining whether an entity is an
instrumentality).
203. United States v. Carson, SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 7416975, at *12 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (noting that three other district courts, including Aguilar, have
interpreted the FCPA’s “instrumentality” and “foreign official” provision in the same
manner).
204. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 41, at 803 (noting that the business world
still considers FCPA fines as merely the cost of doing business with little deterrent
effect).
205. Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 781, 820-21 (2012).
206. Id. at 820-21.
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the courts employ a totality of the circumstances test determining
reasonableness, but such a test necessitates an active judiciary
that fleshes out the conduct that constitutes a search or seizure.207
With the court system’s inability to provide sufficient guidance in
Carson and Aguilar, the totality-of-circumstances approach offers
little guidance to businesses. Furthermore, businesses do not
seem to be affected by the increase in the FCPA’s enforcement208
because they avoid trial by settling with the DOJ through
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.209 As a
result, given that businesses are not fighting the corruption
charges, the courts cannot provide businesses with more direc-
tion,210 such as defining an instrumentality and the type of
employees that will rise to the level of a foreign official.
III. CONCLUSION
The totality-of-circumstances approach, without more, pro-
vides little guidance for businesses attempting to operate in for-
eign territories. As a result, the FCPA, ironically, was intended to
help U.S. companies compete in foreign markets, but now cripples
those businesses.211 Even more troubling for the business commu-
nity, the enforcement of the FCPA includes fines and prison time
for company executives, both of which have rapidly increased as
well.212 Thus, Congress must take the initiative and act. The legal
207. Alysa B. Koloms, Stripping Down the Reasonableness Standard: The Problems
with Using in Loco Parentis to Define Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 169, 181 (2011) (“[t]he Singleton Court’s misplaced emphasis on
cases that did not support their legal proposition undoubtedly stems from the
Supreme Court’s refusal to flesh out what constitutes a reasonable search.”).
208. Yockey, supra note 205, at 801 (arguing that the FCPA sanctions do not deter
businesses from engaging in corruption and the U.S. government should sanction
businesses by denying contracts to really make the FCPA effective).
209. Westbrook, supra note 30, at 562 (noting that businesses rarely challenge
FCPA charges); Pete J. Georgis, comment, Settling with Your Hands Tied: Why
Judicial Intervention Is Needed to Curb an Expanding Interpretation of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 243, 281 (2012) (noting that the
DOJ prefers these tools because it avoids litigation).
210. Westbrook, supra note 30, at 562.
211. Hearings, supra note 18, at 2 (statement of F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
Chairman, S. Comm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security) (“The business
community complains that the absence of case law interpreting the breadth and scope
of the FCPA inflates the Department’s prosecutorial discretion and confounds
industries’ ability to conform to the law. For instance, there is no clear rule on what
qualifies as a foreign official, nor what percentage of state ownership qualifies a
company as an instrumentality of the state. Companies lack guidance on how
expensive a gift must be to be considered a bribe.”).
212. See, supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
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community poses numerous suggestions as to changes to be made
to the FCPA. A discussion of each suggestion is beyond the scope
of this article, but Congress must act lest they desire to chill
American businesses’ ability to compete in foreign markets.
